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The role of an effective regulatory regime in promoting economic growth and development 
and therefore international business has generated considerable interest among researchers 
and practitioners in recent years. In particular, building effective regulatory structures in 
developing countries is not simply an issue of the technical design of the most appropriate 
regulatory instruments, it is also concerned with the quality of supporting regulatory 
institutions and capacity. Many of the institutions that support markets are publicly provided 
and the effectiveness of these regulatory institutions can be expected to be an important 
determinant of how well markets function. This paper explores the role of regulation in 
affecting economic outcomes using an econometric model of the impact of regulatory 
governance.  More precisely, it assesses through econometric modelling the impact of 
variations in the quality of regulatory governance on economic growth. Proxies for regulatory 
quality are included as determinants of economic growth.  The results based on two different 
techniques of estimation suggest a strong causal link between regulatory quality and 
economic performance. The results confirm that “good” regulation is associated with higher 
economic growth, which in turn is conducive to the expansion of international business.  
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  21. Introduction 
 
The role of an effective regulatory regime in promoting economic growth and development 
has generated considerable interest among researchers and practitioners in recent years.  State 
regulation is the means by which the state attempts to affect private sector behaviour; but the 
particular meaning attached to regulation and its translation into public policy has shifted 
over time, as a result of theoretical reasoning, new evidence and changes in political ideology 
(Hood, 1994).  This evolving “force of ideas” is particularly evident in the changing focus of 
regulatory policy in developing countries.  Economic regulation by government is associated 
with righting “market failures”, including ameliorating the adverse distributional effects of 
private enterprise.  From the 1960s to the 1980s, market failure was used to legitimise direct 
government involvement in productive activities in developing countries, by promoting 
industrialisation through import substitution, investing directly in industry and agriculture, 
and by extending public ownership of enterprises.  However, following the apparent success 
of market liberalisation programmes in developed countries, and the evidence of the failure of 
state-led economic planning in developing ones (World Bank, 1995), the role of state 
regulation was redefined and narrowed to that of ensuring a “level playing field” and an 
“undistorted” policy environment in which markets could operate.  Deregulation was widely 
adopted, often as part of structural adjustment programmes, with the aim of reducing the 
“regulatory burden” on the market economy. At the same time, however, the wave of 
infrastructure privatisation that spread throughout the developing world in the 1990s  - 121 
developing countries introduced private investment in infrastructure schemes in the public 
utilities during that decade (Gray, 2001: 2) – has led to the creation of new regulatory bodies. 
 
Privatisation and the more general process of economic liberalisation in developing countries 
have produced their own problems and failures.  While economic assessments of the effects 
of privatisation on economic welfare in developing countries have generally been positive 
(Cook and Kirkpatrick, 2003), evidence of political mismanagement and corruption, together 
with perceptions of negative effects on employment, income distribution and the poor, have 
led to growing criticism of privatisation (Birdsall and Nellis, 2002; Chong and Lopez-de-
Silanes, 2002).  General dissatisfaction with the experience of privatisation has focused the 
attention of policymakers on the need for an effective regulatory framework, particularly in 
the utilities infrastructure field, where natural monopoly conditions can often prevent the 
emergence of competitive markets (Parker, 2002). 
  3 
The results of some economic liberalisation programmes in developing countries have also 
been disappointing, with economic performance at the macro and sectoral levels failing to 
show a significant and sustained improvement, as compared to the pre-reform period.  In 
seeking to explain the “failure” of structural adjustment and economic liberalisation in the 
developing world, analysts have sought to show that weaknesses in public policy have 
contributed significantly to the limited impact of the reforms (Burnside and Dollar, 1997; de 
Castro et al., 2002). 
 
Since the 1960s, therefore, regulation policy in developing countries has shifted from the 
model of a positive or interventionist state, to a de-regulation, state-reduction model, to the 
current focus on the regulatory state (Majone, 1994, 1997).  The regulatory state model 
implies leaving production to the private sector where competitive markets work well and 
using government regulation where significant market failure exists (World Bank, 2001: 1). 
Arguably, however, the performance of the new regulatory state remains under researched, 
especially in the context of developing countries with their own peculiar economic and social 
problems and institutional characteristics. Building effective regulatory structures in 
developing countries is not simply an issue of the technical design of the regulatory 
instruments, it is also concerned with the quality of supporting regulatory institutions and 
capacity (World Bank, 2002: 152).  Many of the institutions that support markets are publicly 
provided, and the effectiveness of these regulatory institutions will be an important 
determinant of how well markets function.  The quality of regulatory governance will affect 
regulatory outcomes, which in turn can be expected to impact on economic growth. 
 
This paper explores the role of regulatory governance in affecting economic growth using an 
econometric model.  More precisely, it assesses through econometric modelling the impact of 
variations in the quality of regulation on economic performance.  Although earlier studies 
have looked at governance as a cause of cross-country productivity or income differences 
(Olson, et al., 1998; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002), this paper differs in concentrating on 
regulation rather than wider governance issues. The subject discussed is of real importance to 
international business because of the effects of regulation on the economic environment firms 
face internationally, with consequent implications for trade flows and foreign investment. 
Regulatory quality, as reflected in economic growth performance, contributes to the market 
environment faced by firms internationally. The results confirm that “good” regulation is 
  4associated with higher economic growth, which in turn is conducive to the expansion of 
international business. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 reviews issues in the economics 
literature pertinent to the debate on the role of regulation in economic growth, before turning 
to regulatory measures and proxies for regulatory governance.  In section 3 the models used 
are presented.  Section 4 deals with a descriptive analysis of the data used and reports the 
regression results.  Finally, section 4 provides conclusions and the implications for 




2.  Literature Review and Regulatory Governance 
 
 
2.1 Economic Regulation 
The theory of economic regulation developed from the nineteenth century and the literature is 
now vast (for recent reviews, see Laffont and Tirole, 1993, 2000; Levy and Spiller, 1994; 
Newbery, 1999).  The case for economic regulation is premised on the existence of 
significant market failure resulting from economies of scale and scope in production, from 
information imperfections in market transactions, from the existence of incomplete markets 
and externalities, and from resulting income and wealth distribution effects. It has been 
suggested that market failures may be more pronounced, and therefore the case for public 
regulation is stronger, in developing countries (Stern, 1991; Stiglitz 1998). However, 
regulation of markets may not result in a welfare improvement as compared to the economic 
outcome under imperfect market conditions.  The economics of regulation literature has 
identified various circumstances where the regulation of markets might reduce rather than 
increase economic welfare.  The seminal study by Averch and Johnson (1962) demonstrated 
how regulation of a firm’s rate of return could lead to incentives to over-invest.  Following 
publication of Averch and Johnson’s paper, studies highlighted other potential inefficiencies 
that could be introduced by rate of return regulation, notably distorted service quality and 
higher operating costs (e.g. Bailey, 1973). 
 
Information asymmetries may also contribute to imperfect regulation.  The regulator and the 
regulated can be expected to have different levels of information about such matters as costs, 
revenues and demand.  The regulated company holds the information that the regulator needs 
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this information from the private sector.  Given that it is highly unlikely that the regulator 
will receive all of the information required to regulate optimally to maximise social welfare, 
the results of regulation, in terms of outputs and prices, remain “second best” to those of a 
perfectly competitive market.  Shapiro and Willig (1990) argue that state ownership provides 
more information to regulators than private ownership so contracting should be less 
problematic when the state both owns and regulates.  However, state ownership is associated 
with inadequate incentives to gather and use this information to maximise economic welfare 
(Hayek, 1945).  In other words, there tends to be a trade off between state ownership 
reducing the information asymmetries and hence transaction costs of regulation and the 
relative incentives under state control and private ownership for agents to maximise 
economic efficiency (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Shapiro and 
Willig, 1990; Yarrow, 1999).  
 
Welfare-improving regulation assumes that the regulatory authority’s actions are motivated 
by the public interest.  This has been criticised by public choice theorists who argue that 
individuals are essentially self-interested in or out of the public arena and it is necessary, 
therefore, to analyse the regulatory process as the product of relationships between different 
groups (Buchanan, 1972; Baldwin and Cave, 1999: chapter 3).  This has been refined in the 
concept of “regulatory capture”, which involves the regulatory process becoming biased in 
favour of particular interests.  In the extreme case, the regulatory capture literature concludes 
that regulation always leads to socially sub-optimal outcomes because of “inefficient 
bargaining between interest groups over potential utility rents” (Newbery, 1999: 134; also, 
Laffont, 1999).  In the Chicago tradition of regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976) 
regulators are presumed to favour producer interests because of the concentration of 
regulatory benefits and diffusion of regulatory costs, which enhances the power of lobbying 
groups as rent seekers (Reagan, 1987). 
 
Regulation is also subject to “political capture”; indeed, political capture may be a much 
greater threat than capture by producer groups outside of the political system.  Where 
political capture occurs, the regulatory goals are distorted to pursue political ends.  Under 
political capture, regulation becomes a tool of self-interest within government or the ruling 
elite (Stiglitz, 1998).  More generally, it is to be expected that both the process and outcomes 
of a regulatory regime will be determined by the specific institutional context of an economy, 
  6as reflected in its formal and informal rules of economic transacting (North, 1990).  By 
setting the “rules of the game”, institutions impact on economic development (World Bank, 
2002).  Economic development is seen not simply as a matter of amassing economic 
resources in the form of physical and human capital, but as a matter of “institution building” 
so as to reduce information imperfections, maximise economic incentives and reduce 
transaction costs.  Included in this institution building are the laws and political and social 
rules and conventions that are the basis for successful market production and exchange.  In 
particular, relevant modes of conduct in the context of the regulatory state might include 
probity in public administration, independence of the courts, low corruption and cronyism, 
and traditions of civic responsibility.  “Institution building” including building a “good” 
regulatory regime is one of the most difficult problems facing developing countries and the 
transition economies at the present time (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2003).   
 
2.2 “Good” Regulation, Regulatory Governance and Development Outcomes 
 
To decide whether a system of economic regulation is “good”, or in need of reform, it is 
necessary to identify the criteria for assessing regulatory quality.  Regulation quality can be 
judged in terms of two main criteria – the quality of the outcomes and the processes of 
regulation.  
 
The outcome of a regulatory system can be assessed against the yardsticks of effectiveness 
and efficiency.  Effective regulation achieves the social welfare goals set down by the 
government for the regulatory authority. In developing countries the social welfare objectives 
of regulation are likely to be not simply concerned with the pursuit of economic efficiency 
but with wider goals to promote sustainable development and poverty reduction. Efficient 
regulation achieves the social welfare goals at minimum economic costs. The economic costs 
of regulation can take two broad forms: (1) the costs of directly administering the regulatory 
system, which are internalised within government and reflected in the budget appropriations 
of the regulatory bodies; and (2) the compliance costs of regulation, which are external to the 
regulatory agency and fall on consumers and producers in terms of the economic costs of 
conforming with the regulations and of avoiding and evading them (Guasch and Hahn, 1999). 
 
The criteria for assessing the quality of regulatory processes will be derived from the 
arguments that are commonly used to “legitimate” regulation (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 77). 
  7Parker (1999: 224) argues that a well-functioning regulatory system is one that balances 
accountability, transparency and consistency.  Accountability requires the regulatory agencies 
to be accountable for the consequences of their actions, to operate within their legal powers, 
and to observe the rules of due process when arriving at their decisions (e.g. to ensure that 
proper consultation occurs).  Transparency relates to regulatory decisions being reached in a 
way that is revealed to the interested parties.  The third process which provides regulatory 
legitimacy is consistency.  Inconsistent regulatory decisions undermine public confidence in a 
regulatory system.  Inconsistency leads to uncertainty for investors, which raises the cost of 
capital and may seriously damage the willingness to invest.  Since political intervention tends 
to undermine regulatory consistency, and politicians may be prone to alter the regulatory 
rules of the game for short-term political advantage, consistency is a primary argument for 
some kind of “independent” regulator. 
 
This discussion suggests that the capacity of the state to provide strong regulatory institutions 
will be an important determinant of how well markets perform.  An economy with a 
developed institutional capacity is more likely to be able to design and implement effective 
regulation, which should contribute to improved economic growth.  Good governance is 
“epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with 
a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; a strong 
civil society participating in public affairs, and all behaving under the rule of law” (World 
Bank, 1997).  Weaknesses in institutional capacity to deliver “good governance” may be 
predicted to affect adversely economic development (World Bank, 2002). 
 
Regulatory institutions are a relatively recent addition to the institutional structure in 
developing countries and evidence on the quality of regulation is therefore limited.  The 
evidence that is available, however, suggests that the results of post-privatisation regulation 
have been disappointing. Where research has occurred, it has exposed a number of regulatory 
failures.  A study of 12 infrastructure industries across six developing Asian economies found 
much variation in practices and a considerable short-fall from regulatory best practice, as 
understood in the UK and USA (Stern and Hodder, 1999).  Cook (1999), based on case 
studies of utility sector reforms in developing countries, concludes that creating effective 
regulation and a competitive environment is at best a difficult and slow process.  In the 
context of Africa, it was found that “regulation is being examined as part of individual sector 
initiatives, but these efforts are uncoordinated, and implementation is being left to follow 
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5). Water sector reforms in a number of countries have been associated with second best 
outcomes and inefficiencies brought on by the institutional context within which reform has 
been attempted, especially a failure of the government machinery (Dinar, 2000; Estache and 
Kouassi, 2002).  In India, regulatory structures are associated with acute failures in institution 
building and with a bureaucratic approach that curtails enterprise (Lanyi, 2000).  South 
Africa’s proliferation of regulatory bodies is associated with a lack of clarity about roles and 
responsibilities and with the adoption of policy-making roles independent of government 
(Schwella, 2002: 3).  In Malawi, the electricity industry regulator remains closely connected 
to the state electricity industry, compromising any notion of real regulatory independence and 
encouraging capture.
1 Chang (2002) identifies similar weaknesses in the regulatory 
institutions for telecommunications in Guyana.  In Sri Lanka, the policies governing the 
regulatory process are judged to have been ad hoc and based on short-term political interests, 
with deficiencies apparent at each stage of the process (Knight-John, 2002).  Experiences in 
the transitional economies also demonstrate much variability in the performance of the newly 
established regulatory institutions (Cave and Stern, 1998). 
 
In the financial sector, limited regulatory capacity contributed to the instability of the 
financial sector during the 1997 Asian crisis (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2000).   
Similarly, liberalisation of the financial sector in sub-Saharan African economies has exposed 
the weakness of financial regulation and has resulted in widespread bank failure and systemic 
weaknesses (Maimbo, 2002; Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2002). In recognition that not all 
is well, the World Bank (2001: v) has stressed the importance of “improving regulatory 
regimes and building institutions and capacity effectively to supervise the private sector”. 
The Asian Development Bank (2000: 18) has also emphasised the need for improved 
regulation. 
 
Several papers have identified the causal effects of better governance on higher per capita 
incomes in the long run, using regressions with instrumental variables on a cross-section of 
countries (Barro, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002).  The causal chain 
between governance and economic outcome has also been examined.  Some studies find that 
the quality of governance and institutions is important in explaining rates of investment, 
                                                 
1 One of the authors of this paper has been involved in the design of regulatory institutions for Malawi. 
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improving the climate for capital creation (Clague et al., 1995; Keefer and Knack, 1995; 
Mauro, 1995; World Bank, 2003).  Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) show that differences in 
the efficacy of public spending can be explained by the quality of governance.  Using cross-
country data, they find that public health spending lowers child and infant mortality rates in 
countries with good governance, and that as countries improve their governance, public 
spending on primary education becomes effective in increasing educational attainment.   
Olson et al. (1998) find that productivity growth is higher in countries with better institutions 
and quality of governance.  Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) reinforce these findings relating the 
quality of governance to economic outcomes using a data set covering 175 countries for the 
period 2000-01.  
 
2.3  Measures of Regulatory Governance 
 
The literature suggests, therefore, that the ability of the state to provide effective regulatory 
institutions will be an important determinant of how an economy performs.  The major 
variable of interest is the quality of regulatory governance.  Other researchers have 
operationalised the broad concept of governance using two different groups of variables.  The 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is produced by a private company for sale to firms 
and portfolio managers who are considering foreign investments.  The ICRG data set is 
produced annually and covers three aspects of government – bureaucratic quality, law and 
order and corruption (Political Risk Services, 2002; King and Zeng, 2000 for ICRG data 
covering 1989-95).  Each variable is measured on a points scale with higher points denoting 
better performance with respect to the variable concerned.  The assessment is based on expert 
analysis from an international network and is subject to peer review.  The ICRG variables 
have been used as proxies for the quality of governance (Neumayer, 2002; Olson et al., 
1998). 
 
The second set of governance variables comprises a set of six aggregate indicators developed 
by the World Bank and drawn from 194 different measures (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002).  
These indicators are based on several different sources (including international organisations, 
political and business risk rating agencies, think tanks and non-governmental bodies) and a 
linear unobserved components model is used to aggregate these various sources into one 
  10aggregate indicator.
2  The indicators are normalised, with higher values denoting better 
governance.  The six indicators provide a subjective assessment of the following aspects of a 
country’s quality of governance: 
 
−  Voice and accountability: respect for political rights and civil liberties, public 
participation in the process of electing policy makers, independence of media, 
accountability and transparency of government decisions. 
−  Political instability: political and social tension and unrest, instability of government. 
−  Government effectiveness: perceptions of the quality of public provision, quality of 
bureaucracy, competence of civil servants and their independence from political pressure, 
and the credibility of government decisions. 
−  Regulatory quality: burden on business via quantitative regulations, price controls and 
other interventions in the economy. 
−  Rule of law: respect for law and order, predictability and effectiveness of the judiciary 
system, enforceability of contracts. 
−  Control of corruption: perceptions of the exercise of public power for private gain. 
 
In this study we focus on the regulatory quality and government effectiveness variables in the 
World Bank data set, which is more suitable than ICRG data for our purposes.  These two 
variables are the closest to capturing the nature of the aspects of regulatory governance 
discussed above, which can be summarised under the headings of regulatory quality and 
process.  Regulatory quality is taken as a proxy for the quality of the outcomes of applying 
regulatory instruments.  Government effectiveness proxies the process dimensions 
(consistency, accountability, transparency) of regulatory governance.  All six World Bank 
indicators, however, are closely related, as indicated by the extent of the bivariate correlation 
between them shown in table 1. 
 
(Table 1 here). 
 
The objective of the empirical analysis reported below is to test for a causal link between 
regulation and economic performance.  The approach is to adopt a growth accounting 
                                                 
2 This expresses the observed data in each cluster as a linear function of the unobserved common component of 
governance, plus a disturbance terms to capture perception errors and sampling variation in each indicator 
(Kaufmann, et al., 1999). 
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regulation is entered as an input in the production function. 
 
Neoclassical growth modelling began with the work of Solow (1956), who employed a neo-
classical production function to explain economic growth in the USA during the first half of 
the twentieth century.  Important assumptions of this approach are constant returns to scale 
and diminishing returns to investment, which imply that for a given rate of saving and 
population growth economies move towards their steady-state growth path.  This can be 
extended to differences in income levels between countries, to argue that in the long run 
income per capita levels will converge. A lack of empirical support for convergence and the 
presence of a large, unexplained “residual” factor in the function estimates have presented a 
major challenge to these models. 
 
The endogenous growth theory put forward by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) led to 
renewed interest in economic growth analysis.  An important advantage of endogenous over 
traditional growth models is that, through the assumption of constant or increasing returns to 
a factor input, in particular human capital, it is possible to explain a lack of growth and 
income convergence between countries and helps account more fully for the residual factor in 
Solow-type analyses.  The “growth accounting” exercises, popularised by Barro and others 
(Barro, 1991, 2000; Barro and Salai-i-Martin, 1999) fall within the generalised Solow-type 
growth model.  An important characteristic of this approach is the inclusion of various 
indicators of economic structure.  Most empirical research using this approach has found 
evidence of “conditional” convergence, where convergence is conditional on the level or 
availability of complementary forms of investment, including human capital and a supportive 
policy environment. This suggests that the failure of developing countries to converge on the 
income levels of developed countries may be attributed, at least in part, to institutional 
factors.
3  The importance of institutional capacity to design and implement effective 
economic policy has been demonstrated in various empirical studies of cross-country growth, 
for example Sachs and Warner (1995) and Barro (2000).  A similar approach is adopted in 
this study, to examine the role of regulatory institutional capacity in accounting for cross-
country variations in economic growth. 
                                                 
3 However, neither neoclassical nor endogenous growth theory gave regulation an explicit role. By assuming 
that output is at the limit provided by the available factor inputs and technology, neoclassical growth theory 
implicitly assumed optimal regulation. 
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An issue that needed to be addressed at the outset is causality.  It could be argued that instead 
of regulatory quality determining economic growth, regulatory quality could be determined 
by the economy’s growth rate. Economies that grow faster are able to generate higher levels 
of income and are therefore able to support the development of better institutions.  Or, 
alternatively, there may be a level of simultaneity, in the sense that institutional quality 
generates more sustained economic growth, which in turn supports more and better 
regulatory institutions. 
 
The Granger causality test is commonly used in empirical work to establish the direction of 
causation.  However, this test is sensitive to the length of lags of variables used and therefore 
requires a relatively long time series dimension to be able to select the right length of lag and 
to be relatively confident about the conclusion drawn.  The problem we face is that the time 
dimension of most variables in our data set is rather limited; in the case of regulatory 
governance we only have one observation per country.  We were therefore unable to apply 
the Granger causality test.  Instead, and less formally, we note that the existing literature is 
consistent with institutional change leading to economic growth.  For example, Olson et al. 
(1998) argue that causation runs from institutional change to economic change using the 
examples of China, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and Chile.  They conclude that ‘Simultaneity 
bias appears to be a theoretical, but not a realistic, possibility’ (p.33). Kaufmann and Kraay 
(2002) implement an empirical procedure for testing for causation, which leads to the 
identification of strong positive causal effects running from better governance to higher per 
capita incomes, but weak and even negative causation in the opposite direction from per 
capita incomes to governance.  The latter result, they argue, may be the consequence of elites 
with rising incomes using laws and regulations for their own rather than the social benefit. 
We proceed, therefore, on the assumption that the causation is from regulatory quality to 
economic performance. 
 
3. The  Modelling 
 
The approach used in the modelling is to assume that each country’s production possibility 
set, in common with most literature in this area, is described by a Cobb-Douglas production 
function: 
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where Y is the output level; A, level of productivity; K, stock of capital; and L, stock of 
labour -  ‘i’ and ‘t’ stand for country and time respectively.  Assuming that the production 
function exhibits constant return to scale with respect to physical inputs,  (2) can be written in 
per capita terms as: 
  
it it it yA k
α =           ( 2 )  
 
where small letters refer to per capita units.  Assume a simple Keynesian capital 
accumulation rule according to the following specification: 
 
/( dk dt sy n k ) δ =−+          ( 3 )  
 
where dk/dt is the rate of change of the per capita capital stock, which is assumed to be equal 
to the flow of saving (equal to investment) minus capital depreciation and the growth of the 
labour force. In this equation s is the share of gross saving in output per capita, δ  is the 
depreciation of capital and n the rate of growth of population as a proxy for the growth of the 
labour force.  Setting (3) equal to zero gives us the steady state solution for the stock of per 
capita capital; k=sy/(n+δ ).  Taking the logarithm of both sides of equation (2) and replacing 
the steady state solution for k from above into (2) gives the steady state solution for output 
per capita, which is as follows: 
 
* ( ) [1/(1 )][ ( /( )] it it it it it ln y ln A ln s n α α =− + + δ
0 )
      ( 4 )  
 
Where (*) above the variable signifies the steady state solution.   
 
We adopt the Mankiw et al. (1992) assumption that economies move towards their steady 
state solution according to the following approximation: 
 
*
0 ( it i it i ln y lny lny lny λ −= −         ( 5 )  
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' η  is the speed of convergence.  From (5) we can solve 
for the growth of per capita output, which is as follows: 
 
*
0 (/ ) ( ) it it i gt l n y l n λ =− y
y
        ( 6 )  
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Where Ai0 specifies the initial level of productivity and ‘γ ’ its rate of growth per period.     
Substituting for A from (8) into (7), per capita growth of output (g) is represented by the 
following relationship: 
 
10 2 3 4 (/ ( ) ) i i it it it i g ln A ln s n lny 0 φ φγ φ δ φ =+ + + −      (9) 
 
where 12 3 4 /( 1 ) , / ( 1 ) , /( 1 ) , /. t t and t φ λα φ λ α φ λ αα φ λ =− = −= − =  Adding some control 
and qualitative variables as well as a stochastic term to (9) provides the model which we use 
to assess the role that regulatory quality plays in economic growth. 
  
In this model differences in total factor productivity growth rates are related to regulatory 
quality and control variables. Variables added to equation (9) broadly follow the growth 
empirics literature, such as Barro (1991, 2000), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995).   
Amongst the control variables included in most empirical research are initial conditions, both 
in terms of the level of development (as proxied by GDP per capita) as well as human capital 
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inflation, trade openness and the government’s involvement in economic activities.   
Qualitative variables can also be added to account for specific events in a country, as well as 
data heterogeneity when panel data are used.  In our analysis, depending on the nature of data 
set constructed, we make use of all or some of these variables to make sure that our 
regressions are fully specified. 
 
Total productivity growth, ’γ ’, is expected to play an important role in total growth within an 
economy.  In the context of our specification in (9) we make the additional assumption, 
drawing on the literature relating to regulation in developing countries reviewed earlier, that 
productivity growth ’γ ’ directly varies with the quality of regulatory institutions in the 
country.  Those countries with good institutions in place can design and implement policies 
that allow them to continue with their future growth.  If instead the country in question lacks 
or has a weak institutional structure, its growth potential is likely to be diminished because 
the design and implementation of appropriate policies are then adversely affected.  In the case 
of developing countries, in particular, to be able to benefit from being a latecomer in terms of 
industrialisation and grow at a high speed to “catch up”, it is important that institutional 
supports are present to realise the potential for income convergence.   
 
We assume that ’γ ’ in (9) varies directly with institutional quality.  In the absence of better 
information about the initial institutional quality, we adopted educational attainment as a 
proxy variable. At first blush this may seem an unusual choice, but our proxy, secondary 
school enrolment, is highly correlated with the regulatory governance variables we are using 
(see Table 3 below), supporting its choice as a sound proxy for initial institutional quality in 
general.
4 The finding that education is highly correlated with our regulatory variables is an 
interesting finding in itself and one worthy of further exploration in future research. We do 
not pursue it further here. 
 
We apply two methods of estimation to the model specified by equation (9).  One is based on 
cross-section analysis, in which we attempt to measure directly any possible impact that 
regulation has on economic growth.  The second is based on panel data, in which we 
                                                 
4 Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) argue that the initial level of human capital can affect the growth path of 
productivity. Olson et al. (1998) also use secondary school enrolment as a proxy explanatory variable in their 
growth study. 
  16indirectly estimate the growth contribution of regulation.  The reason for applying different 
estimation procedures is due to our data on the indexes of regulation; we have only one 
observation per country. Therefore, for the cross-section regression we average the relevant 
data over the period 1980-1999 and combine the result with the regulation data.  This allows 
a direct measure of the possible role that regulation plays in growth, using equation (9) as a 
base to estimate  2 φ .    In the second method we adopt a variant of the one applied by Olson et 
al. (1998) and apply the fixed effects technique
5 to the panel data constructed.  This data set 
combines cross-section and time-series data for the countries included in the first data set.  
This procedure, which essentially involves including a dummy for every country in the 
estimated equation, produces consistent estimates even where data are not available for some 
time-invariant factors that affect growth.  The fixed effects estimator does require, however, 
that each included variable varies significantly within countries.  Clearly, even if available, 
the regulatory variables may not satisfy this requirement since institutions usually change 
slowly.  The estimation procedure, therefore, involves two stages. We first regress GDP per 
capita growth in each country per period, ln( /( )) it it it it go n s n δ +  plus a set of country 
dummies.  The coefficient on the country dummies reflects the effect on growth of all the 
time-invariant variables, including regulatory institutions.  In the second stage we use the 
coefficients of the country dummy as the dependent variable and regress them on the 
measures of regulatory quality and control variables.  The coefficients on the measures of 
regulatory quality in the second stage regression reflect the impact of regulation on GDP per 
capita growth after controlling for capital accumulation and certain other variables. 
 
4.  The Data and the Regression Results 
 
Data for the regulatory quality measures were set out in Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) and are 
available for downloading on the World Bank web site.
6  As discussed earlier, the two 
                                                 
5 There are two estimation procedures for panel data, fixed and random effects.  In our case, the fixed effect 
method is the most appropriate one to use for the following reasons:  (a) a priori we expect that regulatory 
governance proxies to be correlated with the intercept term for each country; those with a poor or weak 
regulatory governance are also expected to perform relatively badly in terms of economic performance; (b) we 
are interested in measuring differences between countries included in our data set; the parameter estimate for 
country dummies (the intercept term for each country) is a proxy for these differences.  Intercepts in turn are 
used as a dependent variable in the second stage regression to establish the link between regulatory governance 
and country characteristics captured by the intercept term. The fixed effects method allows us to do this; (c) in 
small samples, similar to the one we are using here, there may be practical problems preventing parameter 
estimation when the random effect model is applied; this is not the case with the fixed effect model.  For a more 
detailed discussion of these issues, see Verbeek (2000). 
6 The series constructed are composite indexes, which are based on a number of variables generated at different 
points in time, mainly in the 1990s.  Information for each country on these proxies, therefore, generally relates 
  17regulation indicators used from this study are regulatory quality and government 
effectiveness measures (the other regulation indicators included in Kaufmann and Kraay 
being highly correlated with these two). Other data required for the regression analysis were 
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
The data set used in the analysis covers 84 countries for the cross-section regression and 80 
for the panel version of the regression (for a full list of the countries see the Appendix).  
Although the main focus of the study is the impact of “good” regulation on economic 
performance in developing countries, a heterogeneous data set was used including some 
transitional and advanced countries as well as developing ones. The reason for including 
some non-developing countries was to improve the statistical reliability of the results by 
including more countries with regional dummies used to capture the differing levels of 
economic development. As information on regulatory governance is only available for one 
period, as referred to earlier, in the cross-section model all other variables were converted 
into one period by averaging for 1980-99.  Initial effect variables relate to 1980.  For the 
panel version, the data cover the period 1980-1999. However, the time series dimension is 
not complete for a number of the countries in the data set and therefore the panel data are 
unbalanced, containing 313 observations.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 provide summary statistics and the correlation coefficient matrix respectively 
for the key variables used in the study. 
 
(Tables 2&3 here) 
 
The first data column in Table 3 shows the simple correlation coefficients between the 
dependent variable, GDP growth per capita, and possible explanatory variables.  The 
correlation coefficients have the expected signs, including a slight suggestion that lower 
government consumption expenditure is associated with higher GDP growth but not with 
improved regulation.  The correlation coefficients between the indicators of regulatory 
governance, namely government effectiveness and regulatory quality, and GDP per capita 
                                                                                                                                                        
to a period rather than a specific year.  Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) highlight certain issues relating to the 
quality of the data used, particularly when it is utilised for making comparisons across countries. However, we 
are not aware of better regulatory quality data, while conceding that better quality data could reveal different 
results to those reported here.  Nevertheless, based on the significance level of the relevant variables in our 
  18growth have the expected positive sign.  The bivariate correlations between inflation and the 
regulatory proxies used are negative, supporting the proposition that economies with better 
regulatory governance are also better able to design macroeconomic policies that stabilise the 
economy and control inflation.  There is also a high correlation between the logarithm of 
initial GDP per capita and initial secondary school education, both of which are in turn 
correlated with the various proxies for regulatory governance.
7  This suggests that, included 
in the same regression, parameter estimates for these variables may not be individually 
reliable, due to multicollinearity.  This is also the case with the two regulatory proxies that we 
intend to use in the analysis, namely government effectiveness (GE) and regulatory quality 
(RQ).  These two are highly correlated and therefore cannot be included in the same 
regression in order to estimate each variable's contribution.  For this reason we considered 
first the contribution of each of these proxies to growth in separate regressions, and then 
combined them by addition to form a composite regulation variable  (RQGE).  
 
The results reported in Table 4 are based on the model specified in equation (9) using OLS 
and cross-country data, as detailed above. Table 4 reports eight regressions containing 
different combinations of the independent variables from our data set. The economic 
variables in the full set of regressions tested included the variables derived from the model 
itself, as specified in equation (9), and measures for general inflation, trade, government 
expenditure, as well as the regional dummies.   
 
(Table 4 here) 
 
 
The regional dummies are used to test the hypothesis that different regions may have 
characteristics that affect growth differently.  This is validated with respect to Asia and Latin 
America, indicating that these two regions had, on average, performed better with respect to 
economic growth than other regions.  A dummy for Africa was found to be statistically 
insignificant; whereas the one covering other countries, principally developed and transition 
                                                                                                                                                        
regressions, we are fairly confident that any differences in the results would relate to the magnitude of these 
effects rather than their sign. 
7 A number of the explanatory variables were logged. In the literature the basic growth accounting model is 
generally exponential (eg Cobb-Douglas), once logged, it becomes a linear relationship which can then be 
estimated.  For the other explanatory variables in our model, logging helped to solve problems of serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
  19economies, was statistically significant and negative.
8  The initial level of GDP per capita has 
a negative sign and usually is statistically significant at the 5% level, confirming 
“conditional” convergence.  Other studies, including Barro (2000), Islam (1995) and Mankiw 
et al. (1992) also confirm conditional convergence.  Amongst other variables included in the 
full set of regressions were proxies for government expenditure, openness of the economy 
(Trade), as well as inflation.  Except for inflation, which we found to be negative and 
statistically significant, these other variables were found to be statistically insignificant at the 
10% level or better and are therefore not reported here.  We also included the initial level of 
human capital as a proxy for the initial level of “institutions”.  This variable, as indicated in 
Table 3, is highly correlated with initial GDP per capita.  When the two appear in the same 
regression (column 7 in Table 4) the level of significance and magnitude of the initial GDP 
per capita variable are adversely affected, which is a symptom of multicollinearity.   The 
initial level of human capital, as proxied by secondary schooling, has the expected negative 
sign and is statistically significant.  This again confirms the conditional convergence 
hypothesis. 
 
The regulatory variables are correctly signed and statistically significant in all cases.  The 
sign and level of significance of the parameter estimates for these regulatory proxies indicate 
that they have a statistically significant and positive effect on growth.  Based on the estimates 
for the combined regulatory variable (RQGE), a unit change in the quality and effectiveness 
of regulation is, on average, associated with approximately a unit increase in growth, 
everything else remaining equal. 
 
(Table 5 here) 
 
Table 5 reports results based on the second method of estimation, which, as discussed earlier, 
involves two stages.  In the first stage, by applying a fixed effect technique to the panel data 
we arrive at the following regression results: 
 
GDP per capita = 1.25 Log Net fixed capital formation + Country Dummies  
         (2.80) 
 
Adjusted R
2 =0.32;  no. of observations=313. 
                                                 
8 The transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe suffered from a large fall in GDP during the 1990s 
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The figure in brackets is the t-ratio.  From the above, the regression parameter estimate 
associated with the country dummies is saved and used as the dependent variable in the 
regressions reported in Table 5. For reasons of space we report only a sub-set of the full 
results. We exclude reporting regressions including the full set of independent variables used, 
as detailed in Table 2, because a number of them proved to be statistically insignificant. Also, 
only the results for the combined regulatory variable are reported - estimates including the 
regulatory quality and regulatory effectiveness variables separately were consistent with these 
results.
9   
 
Our main interest in the regression results reported in Table 5 is with the role that the 
regulatory proxies are playing in explaining the variation in the country dummies. These 
results are consistent with those reported in Table 4. Even though the coefficient values for 
the regulatory variable are lower, the finding is that regulatory governance still significantly 
affects the growth performance of an economy.  Also, there is no evidence of conditional 
convergence in this case and while the Asia regional dummy is as before, namely statistically 
significant and positive, the African dummy is now significantly negative (previously it was 
insignificant), while the Latin America and Others (other countries) dummies are now 
statistically insignificant (previously they were statistically significant and positive and 
negative, respectively).
10 These changes in the results were investigated and seem to reflect 
the differences in the modelling methods used, suggesting that in this type of research the 
precise modelling used can affect the results.  Nevertheless, the overall picture that emerges 
is that the quality and effectiveness of regulation has a positive effect on growth using both 




The provision of a regulatory regime that promotes rather than reduces economic growth is 
an important part of good governance.  The ability of the state to provide effective regulatory 
institutions can be expected to be a determinant of how well markets and the economy 
perform.  The effectiveness of regulatory institutions will depend on both the efficiency of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
and this helps to explain this result. 
9 This is unsurprising given, as noted earlier, the degree of multicollinearity between the regulatory variables. 
10 In this model the regional dummies identify whether there are regional similarities or differences as far as the 
country dummies are concerned. 
  21regulatory policies and instruments that are used and the quality of the governance processes 
that are practised by the regulatory authorities, as discussed in the early part of this paper. 
 
This paper has tested the hypothesis that the quality of regulation affects the economic 
performance of an economy drawing on data in Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) and World Bank 
data.  Two proxies for regulatory quality were included separately and then combined as 
determinants of economic growth performance, using both cross-sectional and panel data 
methods.  The results from both sets of modelling suggest a strong causal link between 
regulatory quality and economic growth and confirm that the form of regulation matters for 
economic performance.  The results are consistent with those of Olson et al. (1998), who 
found that productivity growth is strongly correlated with the quality of governance, and 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), who found that the quality of governance has a positive effect 
on incomes. 
 
The challenge in international business is to provide an environment conducive to mutually 
beneficial trade and investment. In the specific context of developing countries, the challenge 
is to build effective regulatory institutions that have the capacity to provide regulatory 
processes that stimulate inward investment and trade, while meeting the particular structural 
characteristics and developmental needs of the economy. As we highlighted earlier, the 
proxies we use for regulatory governance are correlated with a number of other institutional 
proxies.  One could argue therefore, that what we have established could equally hold for the 
link between institutional capacity in general and economic performance.  However, the 
literature reviewed earlier in the paper is consistent with institutional capacity playing a 
strong and complementary role in regulatory governance. Also, the ability to model 
separately institutions in general and regulatory institutions or governance in particular 
remains problematic because of their complementarity. Our results are best interpreted as 
demonstrating the importance of regulatory quality for economic growth in the context of 
wider institutional capacity building. Finally, we acknowledge that the direction of causation 
between economic growth and regulatory quality deserves further investigation. We believe 
that there are good a priori grounds for assuming that better regulation leads to faster 
economic growth, but recognise that there could be some feedback from economic 
performance to regulatory quality. Nevertheless, despite these caveats, our results are 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
  22consistent with the view that “good” regulation is associated with higher economic growth, 
which in turn is conducive to the expansion of international business.  
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Table 1: The Correlation Coefficients Between the Institutional Indicators 
 




1          
Control of  
Corruption 
(Graft) 








0.69 0.64 0.71  1     
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
0.90 0.90 0.90  0.70  1   
Voice and  
Accountability
(VA) 
0.75 0.76 0.73  0.70  0.75  1 
 
The variable listings vertically define the listings horizontally. 
See text for a brief explanation of each of these variables; for fuller details and information 
on their construction see Kaufmann and Kraay (2002). 
 







GE RQ  Log 
NFCF 




Trade Inflation Govern- 
ment  
expenditure 
Maximum 8.62  2.08  1.24  2.27  9.59  99.70  306.11  4010.70 29.10 
Minimum  -8.28  -1.77  -2.34  0.81  5.91  2.70 2.46 0.51  4.53 
Mean  1.40  0.12  0.29  1.53  7.77  47.85 35.59 95.39  14.12 
Std.  Deviation  2.30  0.90  0.65  0.35  1.05  28.87 44.56 460.75  4.98 
Skewness  -0.71  0.41  -1.24  -0.11  -0.01  0.17 4.00 7.60  0.65 
Kurtosis – 3  3.39  -0.56  2.37  -0.66  -1.06  -1.23  19.01  60.86  0.25 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
1.64  7.63  2.27  0.23  0.13  0.60 1.25 4.83  0.35 
 
GDP per capita = GDP per capita growth (% per annum);  
GE = Government effectiveness;  
RQ = Regulatory quality;  
LogNFCF = Logarithm of net fixed capital formation as a  % of GDP; 
LogInitial GDP per capita = Logarithm of initial (1980) GDP per capita;  
LogSchooling = Initial (1980) secondary school enrolment (%);  
Trade = Exports +imports as a percentage of GDP;  
Inflation = Rate of inflation using country GDP deflators;  
Government expenditure = General government consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP.  
 
  24Value figures were standardised to US$ valuations using purchasing power parities.  
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   Schooling  TRADE Inflation Government   
expenditure 
GDP per  
capita 





0.38  1            
Regulatory 
quality 
0.44 0.69  1             
LogNFCF  0.31 0.35 0.25  1           
LogInitial  
GDP per  
capita  
0.13 0.73 0.66 0.33  1         
Schooling  0.15 0.71 0.59 0.55  0.81  1       
Trade  0.18 0.54 0.40 0.30  0.40  0.38  1     
Inflation  -0.48 -0.26 -0.43 -0.14  -0.06  -0.09  -0.12  1   
Govern- 
ment exp. 
-0.05  0.45  0.26  0.17  0.42  0.47  0.16  -0.05       1 
 
GDP per capita = GDP per capita growth (% per annum);  
GE = Government effectiveness;  
RQ = Regulatory quality;  
LogNFCF = Logarithm of net fixed capital formation as a  % of GDP; 
LogInitial GDP per capita = Logarithm of initial (1980) GDP per capita;  
Schooling = Initial (1980) secondary school enrolment (%);  
Trade = Exports +imports as a percentage of GDP;  
Inflation = Rate of inflation using country GDP deflators;  
Government expenditure = General government consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP.  
 
 
  26Table 4: Cross-country Analysis of the Determinants of Economic Growth 
     (Dependent variable is growth of GDP per capita) 
 
Variables:       1       2      3 
 
    4      5      6      7       8 
C  4.10** 5.03**  7.52* 5.27**    5.59** 3.90**  0.87  -1.87* 
















Schooling           -0.03*  -0.03* 




     (2.28)  (3.60) 
RQ  2.15*              
  (3.14) 
 
         
GE   1.44*            
   (3.91) 
 
      
RQGE      1.22*  1.20*  1.19*  0.91*  1.02*  0.90* 








(4.29) (4.82) (4.81) 
LogNFCF  1.87* 1.54* 1.53* 2.01*  2.00*  1.93* 2.58* 2.68* 


















-0.79* -0.79* -1.15* -1.05*  -1.08*  -0.82*  -0.39   















Inflation         -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*






Africa      0.13       




 (0.14)        
Asia      2.16*  2.08*  1.96*  1.99*  2.03* 










Latin America      1.45*  1.38*  1.31*  1.26*  1.17* 










Others      -1.91** -1.98*  -2.14*  -1.99*  -2.02* 




 (1.88)  (2.23)  (2.51)  (2.39)  (2.42) 
No. of 
observations 
84 84 84 84  84  84 84 84 
Adjusted R
2  0.28 0.22 0.32 0.50  0.51  0.55 0.57 0.57 
 
 
C is the intercept term;  
Schooling = Initial (1980) secondary school enrolment (%);  
RQ = Regulatory quality;  
  27GE = Government effectiveness;  
RQGE = Combined regulatory variable (GE+RQ)  
LogNFCF = Logarithm of net fixed capital formation as a  % of GDP; 
LogInitial GDP per capita = Logarithm of initial (1980) GDP per capita;  
Trade=Exports +imports as a percentage of GDP;  
Inflation = Rate of inflation using country GDP deflators;  
Africa, Asia, Latin America and Others (other regions) are regional dummies. 
 
 
Values in parenthesis are t ratios.  
*     Statistically significant at 5% significance level 
**    Statistically significant at 10% significance level 
  28Table 5: Alternative Cross-country Analysis of the Determinants of Economic Growth 
     (Dependent variable is estimate of country dummies) 
 
Variables       1     2 
 
    3         
C  -0.90* -2.55*    -
1.24**
    






    
RQGE    0.41*  0.21*     




    
Inflation      0.001*     
      (2.97)     
Africa      -1.18*     
   
 
  (2.11)     
Asia      1.40*     
      (2.62)     
Latin America      -0.65      
      (1.18)     
Others      -0.52      
      (0.62)     
            
            
No. of observations  80  80  80      
Adjusted R
2  0.13  0.22  0.45      
            
            
   
 
        
            
            
C is the intercept term.  
RQGE = Combined regulatory variable (GE+RQ)  
LogNFCF = Logarithm of net fixed capital formation as a  % of GDP; 
LogNFC = Logarithm of net capital formation as a % of GDP;  
LogInitial GDP per capita = Logarithm of initial (1980) GDP per capita;  
TRADE=Exports +Imports as a percentage of GDP;  
Inflation = Rate of inflation using country GDP deflators;  
Africa, Asia, Latin America and Others (other regions) are regional dummies. 
 
Values in parenthesis are t ratios.  
*     Statistically significant at 5% significance level 
**    Statistically significant at 10% significance level 
  29Appendix 
 
List of countries included in the regressions: 
 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., 
Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab 
Rep., El Salvador, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, 
Rep., Latvia, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, 
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